

targeted theme. Nonetheless, this book is a nice introduction to the work of these important theorists. Those who are already familiar with the work of these contributors will not find much new here. This book would, however, be of use to researchers who are new to creativity theory, and to graduate students who are looking for an overview of the field.

References

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Minding Words

A.J. SOYLAND. *Psychology as Metaphor*. London: Sage Publications, 1994. 192 pp. ISBN 0-8039-8958-X (pbk)

Although not stated as straightforwardly as one would wish, the basic argument of this book is straightforward: Psychologists, like all scientists, build knowledge upon metaphor and use argument to convince others of their perspectives. The metaphors in addition to a representational force also have an argumentative force. Thus the residue of those metaphoric and argumentative activities, the texts we collectively call psychology, need to be understood in their poetic and rhetorical character if we are not to mistake them for unalloyed accounts of psychological nature as it is.

Through reviews of literature and explicit argument, this book positions itself with the emerging specialization of the rhetoric of science, but retains a specific interest in the unfolding of psychology as an argumentative field with particular issues and a particular character. Indeed the project of the book is to initiate an inquiry into the textual and rhetorical construction of psychology; therefore, the presentation is explicitly cast as a preliminary exploration of possible sites for further investigation.

This exploration takes the form of a series of case studies examining familiar domains of the psychological literature: memory, development, emotion, IQ, mind. Although a wide range of psychological literature is covered in each domain, the attempt is not to create a comprehensive account of debates in the field, but rather to highlight a particular aspect of representational and rhetorical process in each case. It is in these highlighted processes that the book holds the most interest—pointing, for instance, to the metaphor of the ‘promissory note’ to warrant research approaches that have yet to provide results that would establish their validity and value; showing how the identification and definition of the objects of study are framed within metaphors that comprise a set of presuppositions, with both metaphors and pre-

suppositions varying from one theoretical orientation to another; considering how psychologists try to establish or undermine the apparent stability of a phenomenon in struggling over explanatory schemes based on the reality of particular psychological objects; and examining the kinds of stances towards the readers' own states of mind and experiences that psychological authors attempt to establish, so as to enroll or draw the readers into the account being presented.

It is as a preliminary exploration that the book asks to be read and ought to be read. The opening chapters—which discuss the ancient struggle between philosophy and rhetoric and contemplate the rhetorical, literary, and textual studies of science—are more a means of thinking one's way into the inquiry of the book than definitive statements about these domains, as is the medical chapter on the nature of metaphor. These chapters' conclusions do not develop detailed theoretical accounts that bear in detail on the study—they serve more to establish simply that rhetoric and metaphor are appropriate and valuable to attend to in considering psychology. The author, who seems to know philosophy better than rhetoric or poetics, tends to give fairly abstract philosophical accounts of those two more praxis-oriented disciplines. The case study chapters are often slow going because the author must work through much descriptive detail in pursuit of the observations that provide interest. Again, I suspect the author's lack of familiarity with rhetorical and poetic analysis makes for the slow going. Soyland has to work hard to see and report what is going on in the representation and interaction of the language.

Yet even if these first steps are a bit burdened and uncertain, they do lead in important directions. The observations made—particularly concerning the use of promissory notes, the attempts to create stable textual representations of objects claimed to be real and stable in the world, and the negotiation of the reader's attitude and distance toward material about which he or she has intimate experiences—are important and fresh observations within the rhetoric of science and articulate well with observations from other realms of science studies. In particular, examining the workings of the promissory note metaphor can lead to a rhetorical understanding of what to Lakatos (1979) appeared as 'progressive research programs'; consideration of textual stability goes hand in hand with the study of attempts to create stability in the laboratory and stability in professional belief (in the spirit of both Collins, 1985, and Galison, 1987); and the psychological enrollment of readers opens up intriguing connections between reader-response theory, cognitive research, and Actant-Network Theory (in the spirit of Latour, 1987).

References

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 Lakatos, I. (1979). *Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Latour, B. (1987). *Science in Action*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

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